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Abstract—All methodologies for detecting plagiarism to date
have focused on the final digital “outcome”, such as a document
or source code. Our novel approach takes the creation process
into account using logged events collected by special software or
by the macro recorders found in most office applications. We
look at an author’s interaction logs with the software used to
create the work. Detection relies on comparing the histograms of
multiple logs’ command use. A work is classified as plagiarism if
its log deviates too much from logs of “honestly created” works
or if its log is too similar to another log. The technique supports
the detection of plagiarism for digital outcomes that stem from
unique tasks, such as theses and equal tasks such as assignments
for which the same problem sets are solved by multiple students.
Focusing on the latter case, we evaluate this approach using
logs collected by an interactive development environment (IDE)
from more than sixty students who completed three programming
assignments.
Index Terms—plagiarism detection, log analysis, distance met-
rics, histogram based detection, outlier detection of logs
I. INTRODUCTION
Prominent cases of plagiarism like that of the former
German secretary of defense Karl Guttenberg, who plagiarized
large parts of his Ph.D. thesis, have helped to increase public
awareness of this serious problem. Those who enjoy decision
power in politics and industry in particular should be elected or
appointed at least in part based on their demonstrated integrity.
To this end, a systematic eradication of immoral behavior is
needed during education, including a reliable way to detect
plagiarism. Software is available to assist in identifying pla-
giarism, but it can often be defeated by simple manipulation
techniques, such as substituting words with synonyms (i.e.,
rogeting), because such software often detects only exact
matches of text. We introduce a novel mechanism that supports
identification of plagiarized work by capturing the creation
process and comparing the works’ generation process, rather
than comparing only the final products. The creation process
is represented by a log comprised of a sequence of events
that are collected automatically during the creation of a digital
product.
User behavior and sometimes the internal processes of
the software used to make the digital product are tracked
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Fig. 1. Log created using the macro recorder in Microsoft Word. The outcome
is shown on the upper right.
by recording the events involved in the process. Figure 1,
which shows a simple example, illustrates that logs typically
contain much more information than the final digital product,
as the logs contain the entire history of a document’s changes
in the order in which they occurred. A log is also more
machine-friendly to process than a final product is since a log
usually consists of a sequence of events in raw text format,
whereas a final product could contain multiple fonts and
colors and even graphics. The characteristics of logs provide
several opportunities for detecting plagiarism. To the best of
our knowledge, the only reliable way to avoid detection by
our creation-process-based technique requires either detailed
knowledge of the inner workings of the creation software or
a significant amount of manual work.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows: Section
II reviews related work, while Section III discusses multiple
architectures and technical options for log creation, and Sec-
tion IV explains how they support a variety of detection and
cheating strategies. Section V proposes mechanisms based on
histograms of a log’s events to detect plagiarism automatically.
Although automatic detection is the focus of this work, it
may not always yield definite results, so Section VI discusses
manual inspection. Section VII evaluates the proposed process
using programming assignments in software engineering, and
the process’s strengths and limitations are presented in Section
VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Software plagiarism has been discussed from the point
of view of students and university staff in [11] and [17],
which provide a definition of plagiarism and discuss students’
awareness of plagiarism. [11] also mentions that more than
80 percent of surveyed stuff check for plagiarism with about
10 percent using dedicated software, while the others rely on
manual inspection.
The comprehensive survey [21] discusses plagiarism in general
and also three detection methods that focus on texts: document
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2source comparison (such as word stemming or fingerprinting),
search of characteristic phrases and stylometry (exploiting
unique writing styles). A taxonomy for plagiarism that focuses
on linguistic patterns is given in [3], the authors of which con-
clude that current approaches are targeted to determine “copy-
and-paste” behavior but fail to detect plagiarism that simply
presents stolen ideas using different words. Although [21]
mentions some electronic tools for detection, surveys that
cover these tools and systems (e.g., [20], [5], [23], [25]),
reveal techniques that involve computation of similarity for
documents (i.e., attribute-counting or cosine distance) [16].
The relationship between paraphrasing and plagiarism has
been examined as well (e.g., [23], [38]) as has citation-based
plagiarism (e.g., [15], [24], [23]), an approach that uses
the proximity and order of citations to identify plagiarism.
Other techniques cover parse tree comparison for source
code and string tiling [35]. More recent work has identified
programmers based on abstract syntax trees with a surprisingly
high success rate despite obfuscation of code [8]. However,
none of these tools and methods takes the creation process
into account.
Several special techniques address source code plagiarism.
For example, [4] introduces plagiarism detection of source
code by using execution traces of the final program, that is,
method calls and key variables. An API-based control flow
graph used in [9] to detect plagiarism represents a program
as nodes (statements), with an edge between two nodes if
there is a transition in the graph between the nodes. API-based
control flow graphs merge several statements to an API call,
which extracts features and then builds a classifier to detect
plagiarism. Focusing on detecting plagiarism for algorithms,
[37] relies on the fact that some runtime values are necessary
for all implementations of an algorithm, so any modification
of the algorithm will also contain these variables. Detection
of plagiarism for programming assignments that state similar
metrics of source code is investigated in [28], which also
provides an extensive experience report. Similarity in [28]
is based on counts and sequences of reserved words that
assignments have in common.
A comprehensive survey of statistical methods with which
to detect cheating is given in [7]. In a multiple choice test,
a student takes more time to answer a difficult question than
she does to answer a simple question. Statistical response-
time methods [7] exploit this effect, which is difficult for
cheaters to capture. (We believe that this difficulty also holds
for programming and writing a thesis.) Methods that address
the intrinsic aspects of a task, such as using latent semantic in-
dexing for text documents [2] and source code [13], have also
been proposed that might also be applicable for log analysis.
More generally, existing insights on the knowledge-generation
process, such as those in [27] and findings for specific tasks
and practitioners like novice researchers’ writing process [31],
could be used in our work as well. Our proposed approach is
more inductive (i.e., driven by data) than deductive, as it relies
on general insights related to cognitive processes in knowledge
creation.
Human-computer interaction can be logged using any of
many tools. Our evaluation focuses on logging events from
an interactive development environment (IDE), which has
a variety of logging tools (e.g., [36], [32], [18], [33]).
We decided in favor of Fluorite [36], since it gives fine-
grained logging of events. Other tools (e.g., [33]), provide
less fine-grained logging with better privacy guarantees and
gamification approaches, which are preferable for anonymous
usage data collection and evaluation [14]. Mouse movements
and events outside the IDE are not logged, and some tools can
replay sequences of events [32].
Papers like [34] and [1] use logs to analyze students’
learning process. For example, [34] looks at novice students’
interactions with a complex IDE to determine how certain
characteristics, such as compilation errors, evolve with experi-
ence. Students in need of help are identified in [1], who employ
a variety of features in machine-learning. The only feature
of the code snippets they use is the number of steps taken
to complete an assignment. For instance, they compute what
compilation errors occurred and how these errors’ distribution
changes as the students’ experience widens. They identify
states during the evolution of the source code and correlate
student performance with overall course performance. Other
work, such as that in [6], identifies patterns using the frequency
and size of code updates and performs in-depth analysis of an
assignment using a simple language for robot programming.
The study in [30] shows that users can be identified based
on the usage of Linux shell commands, techniques that could
be helpful in detecting copying of partial logs. The timing
between keystrokes [10] can serve as biometric data to iden-
tify users, which could be valuable in our context as well.
Authorship can also be traced by extracting features like word
richness and punctuation from text [19]. The work in [26]
provides an evaluation framework for plagiarism detection that
focuses on text that, for example, has been changed by random
inserts of text and by changes of semantic words. We also use
random variations in our creation of artificial logs.
III. DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE
Plagiarism is commonly defined as the “unjust appropri-
ation,” “theft and publication” of another person’s creation,
including “language, thoughts, ideas, or expressions” and the
representation of it as one’s own. Plagiarism so defined could
refer to copying paragraphs from the Internet without citation,
slightly modifying parts of a fellow student’s for an assign-
ment, paying a third party to do the work, and so on. We focus
on the case in which a supposed creator copies significant
parts of his or her digital outcome from another source. This
“creator” (as a plagiarist is not) might copy literally or create
a modified version of the original by means of, for example,
word substitution or even by changing the content in a more
complex way, such through document structure or semantics,
without attribution. This scenario covers the most appealing
approach for a plagiarist – copying as much as possible with
little modification. It also includes more subtle approaches,
such as rewriting an outcome to avoid the time-consuming
process of deriving a solution for a given task. We do not
attempt to detect when a “creator” copies small portions of a
work unless that portion contributes significantly to the overall
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Fig. 2. Log-creation process and three ways for cheating
effort. For instance, we address the scenario in which a student
copies most of a course assignment or a thesis and do not
attempt to detect when, for example, a short paragraph is
copied unless it reflects a large amount of work (e.g., the
most difficult part of a programming assignment) and its use
manifests in significantly less time and effort (and, thus, in a
shorter or different log), in which case we are likely to detect
it.
A digital outcome for an assignment or a thesis consists of
the files that contain the final product, such as the formatted
text of a thesis or source code. The digital outcome is made
by a creation software like a programming IDE or a text-
processing software and is accompanied by a log file that
documents the creation process by means of a sequence of
automatically logged events. A log often allows the digital
outcome to be reconstructed; that is, the events in the log
describe the creation process step by step, and they resemble
all manual editing. In this case, “replaying” the log yields the
digital outcome, so it is not strictly necessary to submit a log
as well as the digital outcome. We assume both are submitted,
since having both aids plagiarism detection by making it
possible to compare the digital outcome that stems from
replaying the event log and the submitted digital outcome.
The creation process can be captured either by the creation
software’s emitting events or by a general-purpose human-
computer interaction (HCI) recorder that tracks mouse and
keystrokes. These options are shown in Figures 2 and 3,
respectively.
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Fig. 3. Log creation by tracking human computer interaction directly
The setup in Figure 3 for tracking HCI is more general
and more widely applicable than is reliance on logs from the
creation software since not all applications support logging.
However, many widely used tools, such as Microsoft Office
and OpenOffice applications, come with a recorder for macros
(i.e., logs), or they allow installation of plugins to record
user activity (e.g., programming IDEs like Eclipse and Visual
Studio). Generally, logs that stem from the creation software
contain HCI that is categorized into specific events. For
instance, a mouse click at a certain position might become a
command execution event if the click was on a menu item.
Additional events that stem from internal processes might
also be logged. Both setups – tracking HCI (in Figure 2)
and logging done by the creation software (Figure 3) – allow
for similar detection techniques. Tracking HCI raises privacy
concerns, particularly if interactions with applications other
than the creation software are also logged. Therefore, we
focus on the setup shown in Figure 2 and refer to a log as
events that stem from the creation software.
Fig. 4. Log created using a plugin in the Eclipse IDE
An event can be triggered immediately either by a human’s
interacting with the creation software (e.g., by executing a
command) or by internal processes of the creation software.
Commonly used commands are related to navigation, editing
text (insert, replace, delete), selecting menu entries (opening
or saving files), and so on. Exemplary events that the creation
software generates include “autosave” events (logging that
a file was saved automatically), spell-check completed
(indicating that a background process for checking the words
in the document has finished), and breakpoint hit events
in a programming IDE (saying that a program suspended
execution at a breakpoint). An event often consists of a
timestamp, the name of the event (typically the command
type), and details about the event, such as its parameters.
For instance, “2015-12-08 10:00.00, InsertString, ‘A’,
position 100:20” corresponds to a user’s pressing the “A”
key while editing text at line 100, column 20. The exact
content of events and the kind of logged events can vary
depending on the creation software. Figures 1 and 4 show two
examples of log files that originate from different applications.
4We use the following notation throughout this work. The set
of all logs is denoted by L. A log L ∈ L consists of a sequence
of entries. The i-th entry li of log L, which corresponds to a
single logged command or event, is a tuple that consists of a
timestamp ti and an event or command ci of a certain type.
N(L, c) denotes the number of occurrences of command type
c in log L. (We focus on commands triggered by a human
rather than system generated events.) The set of all command
types is given by T. The types in a single log L are given by
T(L). Let LU ⊂ L be the subsequence of L that contains only
commands of type from the set U ⊆ T .
IV. CHEATING AND DETECTION
We elaborate on basic detection mechanisms before defining
the challenges that they present to a cheater. We also show
differences in the detection of plagiarism in tasks like writing
a unique thesis and doing the same assignment as a set of
students.
A. Detection Overview
Detection builds heavily on two mechanisms. The first relies
on investigating whether the distribution of events originates
from honest creation or plagiarism. The second checks the
validity of the log, that is, that the creation software can have
produced the log. Ideally, the log can be “replayed” to yield
the submitted digital outcome.
The key assumption is that a plagiarized work results in a
different sequence and distribution of events than an original
work would have, such as fewer edit events and more copy-
and-paste events. Our proposed detection system relies on
two dimensions: checking for frequencies of a command and
checking for command types used. Relying on frequency
counts of event types that are extracted from each log, the
histogram-based technique computes distances between logs
for multiple samples of event types. Thus, we verify: (i)
whether a cheater and a non-cheater have event types in
common or the cheater uses uncommon command types; and
(ii) whether the command types are used approximately the
correct number of times–not too similar to any other log or
too highly dissimilar from most other logs. In data mining
terminology, we perform a nearest-neighbor search to identify
manipulated logs, such as those obtained by a plagiarist who
changes an honestly created log. We also perform outlier
detection to find newly created logs that stem from plagiarized
work.
Invalid logs are classified as those that originate from
attempted manipulation like plagiarism. For a log to be valid,
it must fulfill semantic and syntactic correctness. Syntactic
correctness refers to obeying certain rules that determine
how events are represented in the log. We say that a log is
semantically correct if the creation software could have created
it. For example, in an empty text editor, an event for deletion of
a character “A” is likely to yield a semantically incorrect log;
since the text editor is empty, the creation software could not
have emitted such an event. Generally, a cheater must know the
state of the creation software, which determines both feasible
events and their impact. For example, pressing the “return”
key might move the cursor to a new line, but if the software
displays a dialog with focus on the “cancel” button, such a key
press might close the dialog. It might be possible to verify a
log by “replaying” its events, as invalid logs are likely to result
in an error message while they are replaying. For instance,
standard office tools come with a recorder for macros that can
function as logs that can be replayed.
B. Creating Forged Logs
We discuss the feasibility of and effort required to plagiarize
depending on the system architectures and the availability
of honestly created logs that could be used to plagiarize.
We begin by elaborating on all three ways to cheat (Figure
2). Other ways to cheat, such as manipulating the creation
software or the plagiarism detection software itself, seem
significantly more challenging, so they are not discussed.
i) Manual Copying: The easiest way to cheat is to interact
manually with the creation software. For instance, a student
might create a thesis by retyping large parts of text from
a website with some rephrasing or by copying and pasting.
This approach is easy, and it always yields a semantically and
syntactically correct log, but it might come with significant
workload for the cheater and/or substantial risk of detection
if done carelessly even if the digital outcome itself shows
no signs of plagiarism. The distribution of events in the log
might deviate from logs of honestly created work, thereby
disguising the cheater. Therefore, a successful cheater must
anticipate the distribution of events that is typical for honestly
created digital outcomes and must forge a log that is close to
such a distribution. Essentially, a cheater must perform roughly
the same amount of interaction with the creation software as a
non-cheater and must interact in a similar way as non-cheaters.
For example, for a programming assignment, the cheater must
perform a similar degree of program testing and “debugging,”
which would not be needed if he just wanted to change the
structure of the code. If the cheater is writing a thesis, he must
perform a similar degree of navigation, redoing, undoing, and
editing.
ii) Simulating HCI: A log can also be created indirectly by
simulating HCI with the creation software. This approach
requires special software that can emit mouse movements
and key-press events. The goal for the cheater is to use
a partially automatic process to create a log that does not
appear to be forged, rather than performing all interactions
manually. For example, a student might copy a large part
of text from another source and paste it into the creation
software, resulting in a single “paste” event in the log that
might appear suspicious. On the other hand, he might use a
special tool that takes the copied text as input and simulates
HCI by sending key-press and mouse-movement events to the
creation software, resulting in a more credible log. Automating
HCI is possible and an essential part of GUI testing [22]
and automation (as showcased by the macro functionality
in office applications). Recording the screen coordinates of
mouse movements and clicks is sensitive to screen resolutions
and software configuration, which reduces portability. For
now, even using an available recording and replay tool would
5require that the cheater configures the tool in order to, for
example, replace a single paste command with single key
presses of the letters of the text or specify how navigation
and editing events should be created by such a tool. A key
challenge for the cheater is to be aware of the state of the
creation software and the events that are feasible in that state,
as well as their effect. For instance, a “cut text” operation is
available only when text has been selected. Non-availability
of an operation is indicated by a gray “cut” icon and menu
item in the text editor’s GUI, and clicking on such an icon
or menu item has no effect, so the creation software does not
generate an event that is appended to the log. Thus, a cheater
who attempts to simulate “cut” operations must ensure that the
command is available if he is to achieve his goal of appending
to the log. In a programming IDE, the user interfaces that
result from a click on ”Start/Run program” differ depending
on whether the program compiles and is executable. If it is not
executable, a dialog with an error message might be shown. If
it is executable the program might run in the foreground while
a toolbar with several debug commands (e.g., for pausing the
program to investigate its internal state) appears. If a cheater
wants to simulate debugging behavior, he must ensure that the
program is executable.
Although simulating HCI always yields a semantically and
syntactically correct log, replaying the log might yield a
digital product that differs from the submitted digital outcome,
identifying the cheater. A human can determine the availability
of a command easily by looking at the GUI, but doing so is
not so easy for tools, which must rely on keeping track of the
internal state of the creation software. Although the cheater
might be able to address these challenges, they make forging
a log automatically complex.
iii) Simulating the creation software: A cheater might also
create or alter the creation software’s log directly if he has ac-
cess to it. In the simplest case, the log is a human-readable text
file that allows straightforward manipulation. A cheater might
add events or change events in the log to mimic sequences
of events that the creation software would emit for honestly
created logs. Analogous to simulating HCI, the cheater wishes
to manipulate the log file automatically rather than to edit it
by hand. To the best of our knowledge, there are no tools
with which to create or modify such logs automatically. The
challenges are analogous to those for simulating HCI; that is,
the cheater must anticipate the software’s internal state so the
log yields the final digital outcome when it is replayed. What’s
more, a manipulated log might not even be semantically or
syntactically correct, resulting in an error message when it is
replayed and immediately revealing a forged log.
Various types of system architectures determine whether
logs are collected online or offline and whether they are created
by software that is running on a device under the creator’s
control. The architecture determines the ease with which logs
can be changed. In the least secure setup, logs are created
offline on a student’s laptop. If logs are not encrypted and in
text format, the student can alter them before submission. In
such a setup, a student might use all three forms of cheating.
In the most secure technical configuration, a student uses the
creation software on a device on which he can neither access
logs nor install software that allows HCI to be simulated.
The availability of logs or recordings of honestly created
works’ HCI facilitates two kinds of forging:
i) Copy and Modify, where a cheater has access to at least one
honestly created log that he manipulates before he submits it.
To minimize effort, he might take a fellow student’s log and
perform only a small number of changes. From the perspective
of detection this method results in plagiarized logs that are
similar to the original log.
ii) Generation from scratch: The cheater does not have access
to a log but does have access to at least parts of the digital
outcome, such as source code from a fellow student or the
Internet, that he plagiarizes by incorporating it in his own
work. This method is more likely to result in logs that are
dissimilar from all other logs.
C. Unique vs. Equal Tasks
Our detection method relies on comparing multiple logs.
If many students do identical assignments, such as to solve
a mathematical problem, we expect similar logs with some
variations. Given a unique task, such as writing a thesis, we
must rely on comparing the logs of multiple students, each
of which writes about a different topic. Detection capability
relies on the assumption that writing a thesis conforms to a
different process than plagiarizing a thesis does, and that that
difference is reflected in the logs through, for example, less
editing. Detection is likely to be better if the theses are similar
in terms of expected effort and are written by students with
similar levels of education.
V. AUTOMATIC DETECTION BASED ON HISTOGRAMS
We compute frequency statistics for each log and compare
them with each other using the counts of each event type,
which yield a histogram. If two logs have very similar statistics
or a log shows use of commands that differs markedly from
those of the other logs, the log is likely to belong to a cheater.
The case of two logs with very similar statistics is likely a
result of copying a log and modifying it, while the case of
markedly different use of commands is likely the result of
creating a log from scratch while copying parts of the final dig-
ital outcome. The metrics we employ to detect pairs of similar
logs and outlier logs use some general design considerations.
The detection should be as robust as possible to a cheater’s
potential modifications; in particular, the cheater’s changing a
single command type should not impact the metric too much
since manually increasing the counts of some commands (e.g.,
moving the cursor left and right to increase the counts of these
two commands) is relatively easy to do. For outlier, low use of
commands that are commonly found in honestly created logs
are a strong indicator of cheating.
A discussion of general aspects of data preparation is
followed by metrics for plagiarism detection.
A. Data preparation
Data preparation might involve data cleaning and transfor-
mation. Data cleaning encompasses removing entire logs as
6well as cleaning the content of individual logs. Assignments
and theses are commonly only partially finished when they are
handed in. The corresponding logs might be removed since
a cheater is not likely to copy an incomplete assignment.
In addition, they are often characterized by their shorter-
than-normal length. As a result, they could limit the ability
to identify outliers since they do not resemble a completed
assignment. For our assignments, we provided a source code
skeleton for the students. A few students made minor changes
to the skeleton that were far from any serious attempt to
complete the task, so the logs contained a sizable portion
of navigation but relatively little editing or debugging. A
cheater who creates a log with similar properties might escape
detection if these logs remain in the dataset.
The content of individual logs typically requires no cleaning
since it is generated automatically but data transformation
could involve renaming events. For example, we shortened
several long command names and ignored all information like
event timestamps and parameters, focusing instead only on the
command type. We computed a histogram for each log that
captures the frequency of each command type. In our data, the
distribution of the number of uses N(L, c) of a command c
across logs L ∈ L is skewed. We transformed the data using
the Box-Cox transform to get a more symmetric distribution
and added 1 to all values before transformation to handle the
case of zero counts, as otherwise the Box-Cox transform might
compute log 0, which is undefined. By B(L, c) we denote
the transformed value of 1 + N(L, c). Figure 10 shows the
transformed distribution for frequent command types, while
less commonly used command types have a dominating peak
at 0.
B. “Copy and Modify” Detection
The goal of “Copy and Modify” detection is to determine
if one log is an altered version of another by computing the
similarity between two logs–that is, the Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficient of two logs. Using all
command types for computation of the correlation might not
be robust to insertion or deletion of a few event types, as in
the most extreme case, a cheater might alter the frequency of
a single command type to such an extent that an otherwise
equivalent log is not seen as similar. Therefore, we compute
the correlation for randomly chosen subsets of commands.
For a pair of logs to be similar it suffices that the correlation
for just one of the subsets is similar. There is a risk that if
we choose subsets that are too small–too few event types or
strongly dependent event types–the distance between two logs
will be small by mere chance, but this is a minor concern
since only a few commands occur in most of the logs.
Therefore, command types must be chosen for correlation
computation separately for each pair of logs, rather than
choosing just one subset of command types for all logs.
Otherwise, if one chooses a subset of rare commands that
occurs in only a few logs, many logs will be classified as
similar since many logs might not contain any of the rare
commands at all. Therefore, to compute the similarity of a
pair of logs we select only those commands that occur in at
least one of the two logs. However, choosing the subset from
only one of the logs ignores the number of different command
types that occur in the other log, which might lead to logs’
being judged as similar even though one of them contains
a significant number of additional event types. Therefore,
we choose half of the subset of command types from each log.
More formally, a subset S of commands is chosen as
follows for a pair L,L′ of logs: We choose half (i.e.,
|S|/2 = ssam./2) of all command types U ⊂ S uniformly
at random from log L (i.e., T(L)), and the other half
U ′ ⊂ S from T(L′) \ U . The entire subset S of command
types contained in the histogram is given by S = U ∪ U ′.
The Pearson-product correlation ρ(L,L′, S) for a subset
S ⊂ T(L) ∪ T(L′) of command types is given by:
n(L) :=
∑
c∈S n(L, c)
|S|
ρ(L,L′, S) :=
∑
c∈S(n(L, c)− n(L)) · (n(L′, c)− n(L′))√∑
c∈S(n(L, c)− n(L))2 ·
√∑
c∈S(n(L′, c)− n(L′))2
The choice of a subset and the similarity computation is
illustrated in Figure 5. In the figure, we chose two commands
of each log. The correlation was computed using just four
values per log (i.e., one for each of the chosen command
types).
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Fig. 5. Illustration of a similarity computation of two logs for “Copy and
Modify” detection using one subset
Let S(L,L′) be the set of all chosen subsets S for a pair
of logs L,L′. The correlation cor(L,L′) of two logs is given
by the maximal Pearson-product correlation ρ(L,L′, S) of any
set S ∈ S(L,L′):
cor(L,L′) := max
S∈S(L,L′)
ρ(L,L′, S) (1)
Potential cheating candidates are indicated by a larger correla-
tion. For example, we might report a number of pairs of logs
having largest correlation among all pairs of logs from L as
cheating candidates.
7C. “Generation from Scratch” Detection
A cheater might not use an existing log for plagiarism but
copy a final outcome (without the log). He might also enter a
modified solution manually or copy-and-paste it before editing
it. In both cases, he creates a log for his plagiarized work.
Clearly, given enough effort and time, any final outcome,
such as a thesis, can be changed to another outcome whose
structure appears to be dissimilar to the original. However, the
process of changing such an outcome typically differs from
that of solving the task honestly. For example, plagiarizing
might be characterized by activities like word substitutions
and reordering, changing the work’s layout, and (in software
engineering) permuting commands. We might expect less
incremental changes, rework, navigation, and (in software
development) debugging and navigating between files in a
plagiarized outcome. Therefore, a log’s containing events of
some command types that are much more (or less) frequent
than they are in most other logs might indicate plagiarism.
Our measure, the outlier score, is a weighted sum of
scores of individual commands. The weights are higher for
commands that occur in many logs at least once. The score
for the “Paste Command” is illustrated in Figure 6, together
with the Box-Cox transformed frequency distribution of the
number of uses of that command per log. If the frequency
of the command’s use is normal–that is, within one standard
deviation from the mean, the outlier score is zero, but the
score rises rapidly to almost one when the frequency of the
command’s use moves another two standard deviations away
from the mean.
Next, we explain the outlier score in more detail and then
explain the reasons for choosing each step in the computation.
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Fig. 6. Contribution of a single command to the outlier score
Roughly speaking, the count of a single command of some
log N(c, L) is an outlier if it is much larger or much smaller
than the count in most other logs. To get a quantitative
estimate, we used the distribution of the Box-Cox transformed
counts given by B(c, L) and computed the probability of
obtaining a count B(c, L) or a less likely count. For that
purpose, we assumed that the resulting distribution of the
transform is normal. We computed the raw outlying probability
praw(c, L) of command type c of log L as follows: We
assumed that distribution of counts B(c, L) across logs for
a command c is normally distributed with probability density
function p using the mean B(L) and the standard deviation
σ(B(L)). We computed the probability that a random variable
X serving as count value is at least (or at most) as large
as B(c, L): Given that B(c, L) is larger than the average,
ie. B(L) :=
∑
L∈LB(c, L)/|L| we computed the probability
praw(c, L
′) := p(X > B(c, L′)) for random variable X and
praw(c, L) := p(X ≤ B(c, L)) otherwise.
B(L) :=
∑
L∈L
B(c, L)/|L| (2)
σ(B(L)) :=
√∑
L∈L(B(c, L)−B(L))2
|L| (3)
praw(c, L) :=
{
p(X > B(c, L)) if B(c, L) > B(L)
p(X ≤ B(c, L)) otherwise (4)
Figure 10 depicts the transformed distribution for frequent
command types. The assumption of a normal distribution is
not correct for all command types, although the majority of
commonly used commands seem to follow a roughly normal
distribution. For the rarely used command types, which
constitute a significant proportion of all commands (Figure
7), many logs will exhibit a zero count and only a few will
have counts larger than zero. Fitting a normal distribution
does not assign enough probability mass to the zero value
itself or to values that are far from zero. It might be better to
model the distribution using a random indicator variable X
that states whether the count is zero (I = 0) or not (I = 1),
together with a conditional distribution p(Y |I = 1) that could
be normal or more heavily tailed. However, we found that
this complexity in modeling is not necessary since rarely used
command types have only a little influence on the overall
outlier score.
Some deviation from the expected value count of a specific
command B(c, L) is supposed to occur. For example, for
a standard normal distribution the standard deviation from
the mean is 1, so one might not judge a log as being
more of an outlier than another log when both are within
some limit of the mean. More precisely, we said that all
counts within a distance of one standard deviation do not
increase the outlier score, ie. the outlier score for a count
X ∈ [B(L) − σ(B(L)), B(L) + σ(B(L))] is zero. The
cumulative probability density of a value being smaller than
the lower limit or larger than the upper limit is given by
0.16. We defined the unweighted outlier score out(c, L) of
command c of log L as follows:
out(c, L) :=
{
0 if B(c, L)−B(L) ∈ [−σ(B(L)), σ(B(L))]
1− praw(c, L)/0.16 otherwise
(5)
The division by 0.16 serves as normalization so that all values
between zero and one are possible.
The distribution of the number of uses of a command type,
shown in Figures 7 and 8, shows that it is not uncommon that
8a command type is used by only a few students. Intuitively,
a log that is the only one that uses some command types is
likely to be an outlier and so potentially part of plagiarism.
We found that honestly created logs often have some unique
command types as well. In contrast, in forging a digital product
(e.g., rephrasing words, changing layout), standard editing
operations seem to suffice, so the corresponding logs do not
necessarily contain special commands that are not contained
in honestly created logs. However, some command types that
are common in honestly created logs are not needed (or are
less needed) to disguise a plagiarized work and vice versa. So
we added weights for each command that state how much
a deviation from the mean is likely to indicate cheating.
Generally, the more logs contain the command, the larger
its weight. Therefore, a strong deviation in counts from the
mean of a command that occurs in all logs could be a strong
indicator of an outlier. We computed the weight for a command
c as the squared fraction of logs that contain the command. The
squaring emphasizes that commands that are not used often
should not impact the outlier metric heavily. The computation
uses an indicator variable I being one if the command c occurs
in log L, i.e. n(c, L) > 0:
I(n(c, L) > 0) :=
{
1 if n(c, L) > 0
0 otherwise
(6)
w(c) := (
∑
L∈L I(c, L)
|L| )
2 (7)
The definition yields weights in [0, 1].
The total outlier score for a log L is given by the normalized
sum of the contributions of each command:
out(L) :=
∑
c w(c) · out(c, L)∑
c w(c)
(8)
The larger the score the more likely a log is to be an outlier
and, thus, to stem from plagiarism.
VI. MANUAL DETECTION
Automatic detection reveals cheating candidates, but only
with varying degree of confidence. Manual inspection of
logs can improve clarity for doubtful cases. Our focus is on
automatic detection, but we also showcase possibilities for
manual inspection that can be classified into more sophisti-
cated analysis of the event logs, questioning the creator, and
other techniques.
The histogram-based techniques discussed in Section V are
general and require essentially no knowledge about the task
being addressed. Detection could be enhanced by performing
manual analysis, such as by visually assessing several stu-
dents’ histograms and looking for deviations and similarities.
Some commands are typically correlated, such as a large
number of “move cursor right” commands that usually also
imply as many “move cursor left” commands, “Insert string”
commands that correlate with “Delete” commands, and the
counts of several commands will change with the amount of
navigation and the amount of editing. One can also check to
see whether necessary event types are missing, are extremely
low or high, or are in the log when they should not be. In
short, a more holistic look at the histogram might be beneficial.
One might also compare histograms based on a subset of the
entire log, which would increase sensitivity and the likelihood
of spotting certain behaviors; it would also allow one to
compare phases of the creation process that are characterized
by different activities, such as when a forged log is a result of
appending to a valid log by editing the digital product (e.g., by
performing extensive rephrasing of most of the text to mislead
conventional plagiarism-detection tools). The distribution of
the last part of such a log might be characterized by a large
amount of text-replacement events that were performed in a
short amount of time. A non-forged log is likely to contain
fewer replacements and more navigation or inserts as a student
appends to the thesis to finish it or reads through it and fixes
typos or changes individual sentences.
In addition to looking at the histograms, one might use
additional analysis using logs, such as looking for common
subsequences to identify copies and looking for pasted content
from external applications. One might also contact the work’s
creator to inquire about the creation process. For example,
the creator should be able to answer questions, such as those
related to where we spent the most time on editing and
in which order content was created. If keystroke timing is
available, one might also conduct simple tests like keystroke
pattern analysis to, for example, determine whether the time
between keystrokes is similar during a supervised test to the
time between keystrokes that is recorded in the submitted
log [10]. Another option is to consider existing techniques
for verification, such as computing the similarity in the final
source code using the MOSS tool [29] or, for a text document,
checking the consistency of multiple works by the same author
[19]. Finally, one might also use techniques that are not related
to creation logs to determine whether a creator is cheating. We
refer to the related work (Section II) for such techniques.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
A. Collected Data
We used the Eclipse IDE with the Fluorite logger plug-in
[36] to obtain logs from more than sixty students for three
programming assignments. We conducted the same analysis
for all three assignments, but all gave comparable results, so
we discuss only the first assignment in detail. Given a skeleton
of multiple files, the students were supposed to write roughly
100 lines of code.
Figure 7 shows the frequencies of certain types of com-
mands. A few commands that were used frequently were
related mainly to editing and navigation. Figure 8, which
shows how many students used a certain command, reveals
that about 10 percent of all commands were used by all of
the students, and about 50 percent were used by no more than
three students. Command use might also be unintentional, such
as when a student chose a menu item by accident. The use
of a particular command type varied widely from student to
student. Figure 9, which shows the box plot of the fifteen
most frequent event types, reveals that the student at the
25th percentile used a particular command roughly a factor
2-15 less than the student at the 75th percentile did. Some
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of the submitted logs were short because they came from
incomplete assignments. Some of the logs also contained work
that was not part of the assignment. We did not filter these
logs, although they are likely to have a negative effect on the
outlier-detection result.
B. “Plagiarism” Data
Dataset 1: All of the logs collected from students were used
to conduct a semi-automatic detection process that identified
potential cheaters automatically and then checked the logs
manually to determine whether they were, indeed, cheaters.
Dataset 2: Dataset two is an extension of Dataset 1, as it
adds synthetic data created through modification from the
original logs without using the IDE. The dataset should help
in addressing two questions: What is the minimum required
change so that a log is not detected as being a modified copy of
another? How much does a normal log have to be modified in
order to be considered an outlier? To address these questions,
each log was modified in two ways:
• Event type change: We varied the number of event
types by removing from the logs a percentage of all of
some types of events (chosen uniformly at random). This
modification addresses the case in which a cheater is not
using all kinds of events because he copied and pasted
the final outcome.
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Fig. 10. Distribution of the 16 most frequent event types after Box-Cox
transformation.
• Event frequency distribution change: We altered the dis-
tribution of events by increasing or decreasing the count
of events. Given a maximal change factor k, we changed
the logs’ counts of each command type by choosing a
random number r ∈ [1, k] and increasing the count in
half the logs by a factor r and decreasing the count in
the other half of the logs by a factor of 1/r. This approach
is in response to the chance that a cheater will use certain
commands more often or less often than most of his
peers (e.g., more copy-and-paste, fewer undos, editing,
and debugging). This approach covers the most appealing
scenario for plagiarism: Taking an honestly created log
and appending to it by editing the digital product.
For each log and each change factor k we created ten modified
versions.
Dataset 3: This dataset extends Dataset 1 by using the IDE to
create a plagiarized solution to an assignment. We considered
several strategies for obtaining a “fake” log from scratch–that
is, without using an existing log–that require increasing effort
from the cheater. Our strategies are similar to [12], which
focuses on Wikipedia articles.
• Copy-and-paste: Copying the source code (e.g., from the
Internet) without modification or any additional activity,
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such as running the code.
• Small Refactoring: Copying the source code and renam-
ing a few variables.
• Medium Refactoring: Copying the source code, renaming
several variables, changing some comments, and running
the code. The amount of work performed is roughly a
factor of ten less than the work shown in the average
log.
• Large Refactoring: Copying the source code, renaming
most variables, changing many of the comments, reorder-
ing statements, making minor code changes, and running
the code to test. The size of the log is slightly larger than
the average log size.
We created three logs manually for each strategy, for a total
of twelve logs. Then we created 100 variations of each of the
twelve manually created logs by changing the event frequency
using a maximal change factor of three, as described for the
event-frequency alterations of Dataset 2.
C. Setup and Parameters
Using a PC (2.7 GHz CPU, 8 GB RAM), we ran our
histogram-based detection on our collected data (all students,
all three assignments). To compute the similarity between two
logs, we chose nsam. = 100 subsets of commands of size
ssam. of 2, 4, 8, and 16.
Experiment using Dataset 1: The objectives of this experiment
were to identify inadequate logs (e.g., incompletely submitted
logs) and their impact. We identified logs that appeared to be
outliers and those that appeared to be very similar for reasons
that range from cheating to students’ erroneous handling
of logs (e.g., not submitting all log data or submitting an
excessive amount of log data that included work beyond the
assignments).
In looking for cheaters in Dataset 1, we selected the pair(s)
of students with maximal similarity in the correlation measure
(Equation 1) and those with the largest outlier score (Equation
8) as cheaters. We manually inspected the ten most similar
pairs of logs and the ten most outlying logs.
Experiment using Dataset 2: Dataset 2 builds on the assump-
tion that there are no cheaters in Dataset 1. The goal of
the experiment was to assess the sensitivity of the detection
method for the level of a log’s deviation from another log or
the set of all logs. For each log, we created a modified log and
then ran the detection algorithm against all original logs and
the modified log. Thus, for each modified log we obtained a
correlation score (Equation 1) and an outlier score (Equation
8). An instructor might have only little time to check for
plagiarism that is used to investigate a few high-risk candidates
for cheating. Therefore, we said that a cheater was detected
if his or her log was among the five most similar logs (for
a cheater who copies and modifies a log) or among the five
most dissimilar logs (for a cheater who creates a log from
scratch). We computed the percentage of faked logs that were
detected and assessed the detection capability for both kinds
of synthetic data (i.e., removing some event types completely
and gradually changing the distribution of events).
Experiment using Dataset 3: The goal of this experiment was
to determine whether the detection method can detect logs that
are created from scratch. As in Experiment 2, we added each
of the created (cheating) logs to the entire set of logs and tested
whether its outlier score or correlation score ranked among the
five highest.
D. Results
The entire computation took less than one hour.
Parameters: The results of all assessments were best for
ssam = 2. This is no surprise since, if a cheater does not alter
the frequency of all of the command types, it is likely that the
correlation is maximal (i.e., 1) because any two commands
will have the same counts. If we pick more commands than
two, different counts become more likely, yielding a smaller
correlation.
Results Experiment 1: The distribution of the distances of
original logs is shown in Figures 11 and 12. Figure 11
shows the correlation scores used to identify copies of an
assignment (i.e., cor(L,L′) as defined in Equation 1), while
outlier scores (i.e., out(L,L′) as in Equation 8), are shown
in Figure 12. Because of variations in individual students’
behavior, gaps are expected, but the larger the gap, the more
suspicious the work. For the original dataset, we judged that
the ten most similar pairs of logs were created by different
students and found the ten most dissimilar logs to be logs
that came from students who were solving the assignment
honestly. Therefore, we concluded that there are likely no
cheaters in this dataset. Some logs did not provide a completed
assignment (i.e., students gave up and submitted incomplete
assignments), so we did not check such logs for plagiarism.
We employed several checks as described in Section VI and
looked at each log’s distribution of commands with respect
to others’ distribution. For example, we created a figure for
each log L (Figure 9) that contained more event types and
highlighted the counts for log L. We also did this for partial
logs but found no suspicious patterns.
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Fig. 11. Histogram of pair-wise histogram distances cor(L,L′). The red line
shows the threshold for being a potential cheater.
Results Experiment 2: When we added synthetically created
logs, we saw an expected trade-off in both datasets: The more
distorted a student’s log, the less likely it was detected as a
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Fig. 12. Histogram of pair-wise histogram distances out(L,L′). The red line
shows the threshold for being a potential cheater.
copy and the more likely it was detected as an outlier.
Detection of modified copies: When we removed 90 percent
of all event types (Figure 13) or changed event counts by
a factor of up to 10 (Figure 14), we still detected about
90 percent of copied and modified logs as plagiarism. The
high detection rate occurred because it suffices to find a pair
of command types that were not modified. This chance is
relatively high even if many command types are altered: Say
we removed 90 percent of command types for a log and left
the counts of the other 10 percent unchanged. For computation
of similarity we chose one command type from the original
log and the modified log with a count larger than zero. The
one from the modified log occurs in the original, but the one
from the original log occurs in the modified log with only
10 percent probability, so there is a 10 percent probability
that the counts are identical (i.e., perfect correlation) for one
subset. If we modify counts by a random factor, there is still
a reasonable chance that a few command types are altered by
a small amount, which results in a high detection rate.
Detection of artificially created copies: Outlier detection re-
quires relatively large changes of frequencies (see Figure
14). When modifying a log created by an honest student,
we must change it beyond the variance across all logs first
before it becomes an outlier. Given the fact that logs vary
strongly, partially due to incomplete or incorrect logs (see
Section VII-A), the change required is also significant, ie.
when changing command execution counts by a factor of 5,
we detect about 40% of logs as outliers. For removing event
types similar reasoning applies, but detection seems to work
better because removing a few frequent event types that occur
in most logs has a strong impact on the outlier score. We
classify about 90% of logs as outliers, if they lack 50% of
events, while being otherwise identical to one of the logs.
Results Experiment 3: Detection worked well in all cases
(Figure 15) since the logs of plagiarized work were likely
to lack entirely or to a large extent some frequently used
commands (e.g., commands for opening files, edits, navigation,
saving, executing the source code).
Although our results are encouraging, our work has some
limitations, as discussed in the next section.
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Fig. 15. Detection of cheaters with variations of logs created using various
approaches.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
We mention the advantages and disadvantages of using the
creation process to detect plagiarism, as well as suggestions
for future work that targets improving automatic detection and
facilitating manual inspection of logs.
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A. Strengths and Weaknesses
We identified several reasons why plagiarism detection
based on logs is attractive:
• Amount of information: Logs typically contain much
more information than the final product does, since logs
usually implicitly include the final work as well as all
actions and changes during the creation process (e.g.,
editing, saving, and printing). Since logs have more
information, they lend themselves to accurate methods
of detection. For that reason, forging a log requires more
effort than does forging the final product. Our approach
forces cheaters not only to modify copied content, as
is required for traditional methods of hiding plagiarism,
but it also demands that they understand and mimic the
creation process.
• Complexity of log forging: Creating a forged log often
requires in depth understanding of the log-creation soft-
ware. Log entries often depend on internal processes that
are hard to predict, such as the exact time of automatic
software updates and the number of lines that result from
inputting a text in a text editor.
• Novel detection techniques: A whole set of new tech-
niques from data mining that are based on outlier de-
tection or nearest-neighbor approaches can support the
detection of plagiarism based on logs. Our technique is
data-driven with direct comparisons among a set of logs,
rather than relying on expert input or dedicated rules.
This approach makes our technique flexible so it is easily
usable for logs that come from different programs and
different tasks from different domains that range from
natural sciences to economics to sociology. Our approach
may also detect plagiarized work that other techniques
that focus on the final product fail to identify.
• Structure of logs: In contrast to the digital outcome,
which might appear as “unstructured” data, such as text
from a data science perspective, logs appear as structured
data, facilitating their analysis.
Other potential advantages are that logs can also be used for
other purposes that might increase learning, including giving
students automated feedback that allows them reflect on their
behavior and capabilities and to see recommended functions
used by fellow students. Knowing that logs are created might
also encourage students to work in a more focused way.
Log-based detection also comes with certain weaknesses
compared to conventional plagiarism-detection techniques. If
logs are similar, the odds of a false positive are still rather
small, but the risk of false positives are higher for students who
behave differently from the majority of students. For example,
if a student happens to require much less rework than other
students do, he risks being classified as potential cheater. The
same holds for students who perform a large amount of editing
to improve the quality of their work. Therefore, our detection
technique often requires manual interaction, such as manual
examination of logs that seem to be forged. Although this
issue might also hold for conventional techniques, the concept
of logs might seem harder for an instructor to grasp and assess,
at least in an initial phase.
In our classes, we require that students collect and submit
logs by installing a plugin that records events. Installation
of the plugin takes less than five minutes and submission
of a log less than two minutes. Students must disable the
logging when they work on private projects. Both limitations
could be reduced or eliminated if, for example, one installs
a private version of the software (without the logging plugin)
and university version (with the logging plugin).
Students may also have to use a particular software that
supports logging for creating their work. In practice, it is
not uncommon for students to be required to use certain
applications, such as templates for theses that are available
only for a particular text editor or a course that requires
the student to submit project files from a particular editor
that was also used in tutorials. In principle, one might use
a HCI recorder or support multiple applications, but doing so
increases the effort required from the lecturer.
In addition, although many applications support logging,
the details of such logs differ significantly, which might limit
the ability to replay a log to create the digital outcome. For
example, whereas the macro recorder in Microsoft Excel logs
mouse clicks in a spreadsheet, the recorder in Microsoft Word
logs only keystrokes and clicks on buttons. In the Excel case,
the (final) spreadsheet can be created by replaying the log, but
in the Word case, while one might check the log for semantic
correctness by replaying it, it might not be possible to create
the final document by replaying the log. Still, the plagiarism-
detection techniques presented here can be employed in Word
by using the in-built recorder to create logs, although a cheater
might forge logs more easily if no additional means are
undertaken to check whether the submitted log corresponds
to the submitted digital outcome.
B. Possible Improvements
There are many techniques other than using histograms,
such as identifying a specific cheating behavior based on rules
like copy-and-paste and paraphrasing. Typically, copying of
text and images occurs outside the creation software (e.g., in a
web-browser), and the pasting occurs in the creation software.
A large amount of pasting in terms of both frequency and
quantity might be an indicator of cheating, and inserting a lot
of text in a short amount of time with relatively little editing
(e.g., delete events) might be an indicator of paraphrasing.
Fingerprinting of keystrokes [10] is another way to identify
forged logs. More generally, one could improve the detection
mechanism to incorporate the timing of events. One might also
look at short sequences of events by, for example, choosing
a sequence in a log that seems unique (any sufficiently long
sequence is unique) and searching for this sequence in other
logs to determine whether the log was copied.
Though all techniques for detecting plagiarism apply to
any kind of digital outcome, we evaluated our technique on
programming assignments conducted in a complex IDE. The
process and tools used for programming are arguably more
complex than are those used to create text documents for
assignments that involve merely expressing ideas and sum-
marizing work, without actual implementation. For example,
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activities like testing and debugging do not occur in ordinary
text-processing, so the set of commands that are used when
creating the digital outcome is reduced. Therefore, forging a
log created in a simple tool with a less diverse command set
might be easier, requiring more advanced detection techniques.
Histograms that use short sequences of events rather than
single commands are a plausible option.
We focused on assignments solved by many students, rather
than theses, where students work on a variety of topics, as
logs of assignments might be more homogeneous than logs
of thesis. Homogeneous logs give a cheater fewer options to
forge a log without being detected since homogeneous logs are
characterized by little variance in usage statistics. Theses also
adhere to a common structure and also have specific creation
processes, and they are significantly longer, resulting in longer
log files. Here, an approach that examines sequences of events
related to a section of a thesis, such as the literature review or
the introduction, rather than a single large log, might improve
detection accuracy.
Whereas simple cheating attempts that involve copy-and
paste and some textual changes are easily detected, we do
not currently protect well against a student who manually
enters text and thoroughly simulates the creation process by
pasting copied text and then conducting artificial editing. If
the amount and way of editing are similar to those other
logs, a cheater might well escape detection. However, without
automatic generation of logs, the manual work in which a
student must invest significantly increases compared to the
work required to alter the final outcome. The amount of work
(measured in interactions with the tool) seems to be similar to
that of peers who work honestly.
To improve detection and support the inspection of logs,
we envision a tool that visualizes the creation process in an
intuitive manner. Such a tool would allow a skilled person,
such as a thesis supervisor or a teaching assistant, to identify
easily whether a semantically correct log is likely to have
been forged. For instance, finding that a difficult part of
the work was done fairly quickly, while other, simpler parts
required a lot of time could make the work suspicious. A
tool that visualizes the creation process in an intuitive manner
might help to avoid false positives by gathering evidence that
supports whether people who are suspected of plagiarism are,
indeed, guilty.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Cheating has always been an issue both inside and out-
side education. We contribute to remedying this problem
by proposing a process for automatic identification of likely
cheaters. Our novel approach requires using readily available
programs (with appropriate plug-ins) to collect logs, rather
than just the final digital result. Ideally, our detection technique
will be combined with other techniques that analyze the
final “digital” outcome, which would make cheating time-
consuming and impractical. Of course, automatic tools that can
circumvent log-based detection are certain to be developed,
so catching offenders will remain a cat-and-mouse game.
Even so, the game must be played to counteract incentives
for cheating and to ensure that cheaters are not among the
graduates of universities who obtain powerful positions, where
misconduct can harm large parts of society. We see this work
as a step in this direction.
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